Notice bibliographique
- Notice
Type(s) de contenu et mode(s) de consultation : Texte noté : sans médiation
Auteur(s) : Ebbs, Gary
Titre(s) : Carnap, Quine, and Putnam on methods of inquiry [Texte imprimé] / Gary Ebbs,...
Publication : Cambridge : Cambridge university press, 2017
Description matérielle : 1 vol. (XI-278 p.) ; 24 cm
Note(s) : Bibliogr. p. 261-272. Notes bibliogr. Index
Carnap, Quine, and Putnam held that in our pursuit of truth we can do no better than
to start in the middle, relying on already-established beliefs and inferences and
applying our best methods for re-evaluating particular beliefs and inferences and
arriving at new ones. In this collection of essays, Gary Ebbs interprets these thinkers'
methodological views in the light of their own philosophical commitments, and in the
process refutes some widespread misunderstandings of their views, reveals the real
strengths of their arguments, and exposes a number of problems that they face. To
solve these problems, in many of the essays Ebbs also develops new philosophical approaches,
including new theories of logical truth, language use, reference and truth, truth
by convention, realism, trans-theoretical terms, agreement and disagreement, radical
belief revision, and contextually a priori statements. His essays will be valuable
for a wide range of readers in analytic philosophy.
Sujet(s) : Carnap, Rudolf (1891-1970)
Quine, Willard Van Orman (1908-2000)
Putnam, Hilary (1926-2016)
Herméneutique
Méthodologie
Vérité
Identifiants, prix et caractéristiques : ISBN 9781107178151. - ISBN 1107178150
Identifiant de la notice : ark:/12148/cb45282856g
Notice n° :
FRBNF45282856
(notice reprise d'un réservoir extérieur)
Table des matières : Introduction ; Part I. Carnap. Carnap's logical syntax ; Carnap on ontology ;
Part II. Carnap and Quine. Carnap and Quine on truth by convention ; Quine's naturalistic
explication of Carnap's logic of science ; Part III. Quine. Quine gets the last word
; Reading Quine's claim that definitional abbreviations create synonymies ; Can first-order
logical truth be defined in purely extensional terms? ; Reading Quine's claim that
no statement is immune to revision ; Part IV. Quine and Putnam. Conditionalization
and conceptual change : Chalmers in defense of a dogma ; Truth and transtheoretical
terms ; Part V. Putnam. Putnam and the contextually a priori.
