Notice bibliographique
- Notice
Type(s) de contenu et mode(s) de consultation : Texte noté : électronique
Titre(s) : Handbook of game theory with economic applications [Texte électronique] / edited by Robert J. Aumann and Sergiu Hart
Publication : Amsterdam ; New York : North-Holland ; New York, N.Y., USA : Distributors for the
U.S. and Canada, Elsevier Science Pub. Co., 1992-<c2015>
Description matérielle : 1 ressource dématérialisée
Collection : Handbooks in economics ; 11
Note(s) : Vol. 4 lacks series numbering. - Includes bibliographical references and indexes. - Vol. 4 edited by H. Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir
Autre(s) auteur(s) : Hart, Sergiu (1949-....). Fonction indéterminée
Zamir, Shmuel (1939-....). Fonction indéterminée
Aumann, Robert J.. Fonction indéterminée
Young, H. Peyton (1945-....). Fonction indéterminée
Autre(s) forme(s) du titre :
- Autre forme du titre : Vol. 4 has title : Handbook of game theory
Sujet(s) : Théorie des jeux
Jeux mathématiques
Mathématiques économiques
Économie politique -- Modèles mathématiques
Indice(s) Dewey :
519.3 (23e éd.) = Théorie des jeux
Identifiants, prix et caractéristiques : ISBN 9780444537669 . - ISBN 9780444880987 . - ISBN 9780444894274 . - ISBN 9780444894281
Identifiant de la notice : ark:/12148/cb447254317
Notice n° :
FRBNF44725431
(notice reprise d'un réservoir extérieur)
Table des matières : Vol. 1 ; Game of chess /Herbert A. Simon and Jonathan Schaeffer ; Games in extenive
and strategic forms /Sergiu Hart ; Games with perfect information /Jan Mycielski ;
Repeated games with complete information /Sylvain Sorin ; Repeated games of incomplete
information: zero-sum /Shmuel Zamir ; Repeated games of incomplete information : non-zero-sum
/Françoise Forges ; Noncooperative models of bargaining /Ken Binmore, Martin J. Osborne
and Ariel Rubinstein ; Strategic analysis of auctions /Robert Wilson ; Location /Jean
J. Gabszewicz and Jacques-François Thisse ; Strategic models of entry deterrence /Robert
Wilson ; Patent licensing /Morton I. Kamien ; Core and balancedness /Yakar Kannai
; Axiomatizations of the core /Bezalel Peleg ; Core in perfectly competitive economics
/Robert M. Anderson ; Core in imperfectly competitive economies /Jean J. Gabszewicz
and Benyamin Shitovitz ; Two-sided matching /Alvin E. Roth and Marilda Sotomayor ;
Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets /William F. Lucas ; Bargaining
Vol. 2 ; Zero-sum two-person games /T.E.S. Raghavan ; Game theory and statistics /Gideon
Schwarz ; Differential games /Avner Friedman ; Differential games ; economic applications
/Simone Clemhout and Henry Y. Wan, Jr. ; Communication, correlated equilibria and
incentive compatibility /Roger B. Myerson ; Signalling /David M. Kreps and Joel Sobel
; Moral hazard /Prajit K. Dutta and Roy Radner ; Search /John McMillan and Michael
Rothschild ; Game theory and Evolutionary biology /Peter Hammerstein and Reinhard
Selten ; Game theory models of peace and war /Barry O'Neill ; Voting procedures /Steven
J. Brams ; Social choice /Hervé Moulin ; Power and stability in politics /Philip D.
Straffin Jr. ; Game theory and public economics /Mordecai Kurz ; Cost allocation /H.P.
Young ; Cooperative models of bargaining /William Thomson ; Games in coalitional form
/Robert J. Weber ; Coalition structure /Joseph Greenberg ; Game-theoretic aspects
of computing /Nathan Linial ; Utility and subjective probability /Peter C. Fi
Vol. 3 ; Strategic equilibrium /Eric Van Damme ; Foundations of strategic equilibrium
/John Hillas and Elon Kohlberg ; Incomplete information /Robert J. Aumann and Aviad
Heifetz ; Non-zero-sum two-person games /T.E.S. Raghavan ; Computing equilibria for
two-person games /Bernhard Von Stengel ; Non-cooperative games with many players /M.
Ali Khan and Yeneng Sun ; Stochastic games /Jean-François Mertens ; Stochastic games:
recent results /Nicolas Vielle ; Game theory and industrial organization /Kyle Bagwell
and Asher Wolinsky ; Bargaining with incomplete information /Lawrence M. Ausubel,
Peter Cramton and Raymond J. Deneckere ; Inspection games /Rudolf Avenhaus, Bernhard
Von Stengel and Shmeuel Zamir ; Economic history and game theory /Avner Greif ; Shapley
Value /Eyal Winter ; Variations on the Shapley value /Dov Monderer and Dov Samet ;
Values of non-transferable utility games /Richard P. McLean ; Values of games with
infinitely many players /Abraham Neyman ; Values of perfectly competitive econom
Vol. 4 ; Rationality /Ken Binmore ; Advances in in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games /Rida Laraki,
Sylvain Sorin ; Games on Networks /Matthew O. Jackson, Yves Zenou ; Reputations in
Repeated Games /George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson ; Coalition Formation /Debraj Ray,
Rajiv Vohra ; Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics /Chris Wallace, H. Peyton Young
; Advances in Auctions /Todd R. Kaplan, Shmuel Zamir ; Combinatorial Auctions /Rakesh
V. Vohra ; Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Through the Lens of Multiunit Auctions /Noam
Nisan ; Behavioral Game Theory Experiments and Modeling /Colin F. Camerer, Teck-Hua
Ho ; Evolutionary Game theory in Biology / ; Peter Hammerstein, Olof Leimar -- ; Epistemic
Game Theory /Eddie Dekel, Marciano Siniscalchi ; Population games and Deterministic
Evolutionary Dynamics /William H. Sandholm ; The Complexity of Computing Equilibria
/Christos Papadimitriou ; Theory of Combinatorial Games /Aviezri S. Fraenkel, Robert
A. Hearn, Aaron N. Siegel ; Game Theory and Distributed Control /Jason R
