Notice bibliographique
- Notice
Type(s) de contenu et mode(s) de consultation : Texte noté : sans médiation
Auteur(s) : Kolenda, Christopher D.
Titre(s) : Zero-sum victory [Texte imprimé] : what we're getting wrong about war / Christopher D. Kolenda
Publication : Lexington (Ky.) : the University press of Kentucky, copyright 2021
Description matérielle : 1 vol. (XV-375 p.) ; 24 cm
Note(s) : Notes bibliogr. Index
"Why have the major post-9/11 US military interventions turned into quagmires? Despite
huge power imbalances in the United States's favor, significant capacity-building
efforts, and repeated tactical victories by what many observers call the world's best
military, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq turned intractable. The US government's
fixation on zero-sum, decisive victory in these conflicts is a key reason why military
operations to overthrow two developing-world regimes failed to successfully achieve
favorable and durable outcomes. In Zero-Sum Victory, retired US Army colonel Christopher
D. Kolenda identifies three interrelated problems that have emerged from the government's
insistence on zero-sum victory. First, the US government has no organized way to measure
successful outcomes other than a decisive military victory, and thus, selects strategies
that overestimate the possibility of such an outcome. Second, the United States is
slow to recognize and modify or abandon losing strategies; in both cases, US officials
believe their strategies are working, even as the situation deteriorates. Third, once
the United States decides to withdraw, bargaining asymmetries and disconnects in strategy
undermine the prospects for a successful transition or negotiated outcome. Relying
on historic examples and personal experience, Kolenda draws thought-provoking and
actionable conclusions about the utility of American military power in the contemporary
world-insights that serve as a starting point for future scholarship as well as for
important national security reforms"
Sujet(s) : Politique militaire -- États-Unis -- 2000-....
Culture stratégique -- États-Unis -- 2000-....
Conflits de basse intensité
Genre ou forme : Études de cas
Identifiants, prix et caractéristiques : ISBN 9780813152769. - ISBN 0813152763. - ISBN 9780813152837 (erroné). - ISBN 9780813152899
(erroné)
Identifiant de la notice : ark:/12148/cb47105730p
Notice n° :
FRBNF47105730
(notice reprise d'un réservoir extérieur)
Table des matières : Introduction ; The past as prologue: the Vietnam War ; Toward a war termination
framework ; The pursuit of decisive victory in Afghanistan ; Persisting in a failing
approach ; Ending the war in Afghanistan ; Pursuit of decisive victory in Iraq
; Staying the course in Iraq ; Ending the war in Iraq ; Implications.