Notice bibliographique
- Notice
Type(s) de contenu et mode(s) de consultation : Texte noté : sans médiation
Auteur(s) : Marcus, Eric (1968-....)
Titre(s) : Belief, inference, and the self-conscious mind [Texte imprimé] / Eric Marcus
Publication : Oxford ; New York (N.Y.) : Oxford university press, 2021
Description matérielle : 1 vol. (viii-161 p.) ; 24 cm
Note(s) : Bibliogr. p. [153]-157. Notes bibliogr. Index
"It is impossible to hold patently contradictory beliefs in mind together at once.
Why? Because we know that it is impossible for both to be true. This impossibility
is a species of rational necessity, a phenomenon that uniquely characterizes the relation
between one person's beliefs. Here, Eric Marcus argues that the unity of the rational
mind--what makes it one mind--is what explains why, given what we already believe,
we can't believe certain things and must believe certain others in this special sense.
What explains this is that beliefs, and the inferences by which we acquire them, are
constituted by a particular kind of endorsement of those very states and acts. This,
in turn, entails that belief and inference are essentially self-conscious: to hold
a belief or to make an inference is at the same time to know that one does. An examination
of the nature of belief and inference, in light of the phenomenon of rational necessity,
reveals how the unity of the rational mind is a function of our knowledge of ourselves
as bound to believe the true. Rational self-consciousness is the form of mental togetherness"
Sujet(s) : Inférence
Raison -- Philosophie
Croyance (philosophie)
Doute
Nécessité -- Philosophie
Conscience de soi
Philosophie de l'esprit
Indice(s) Dewey :
128.2 (23e éd.) = L'esprit
Identifiants, prix et caractéristiques : ISBN 9780192845634. - ISBN 0192845632
Identifiant de la notice : ark:/12148/cb46741175r
Notice n° :
FRBNF46741175
(notice reprise d'un réservoir extérieur)
