Notice bibliographique
- Notice
Type(s) de contenu et mode(s) de consultation : Texte noté : sans médiation
Auteur(s) : Doyle, James (1963-....)
Titre(s) : No morality, no self [Texte imprimé] : Anscombe's radical skepticism / James Doyle
Publication : Cambridge (Mass.) : Harvard university press, 2018
Description matérielle : 1 vol. (xi-238 p.) ; 25 cm
Note(s) : Bibliogr. p. [223]-230. Notes bibliogr. Index
It is becoming increasingly apparent that Elizabeth Anscombe (1919-2001), long known
as a student, friend and translator of Wittgenstein, was herself one of the most important
philosophers of the twentieth century. No Morality, No Self examines her two best-known
papers, in which she advanced her most amazing theses. In 'Modern Moral Philosophy'
(1958), she claimed that the term moral, understood as picking out a special, sui
generis category, is literally senseless and should therefore be abandoned. In 'The
First Person' (1975), she maintained that the word 'I' is not a referring expression:
in other words, its function in the language is not to pick out the speaker, or 'the
self' - or any entity whatsoever. Both papers are considered influential, and are
frequently cited; but their main claims, and many of their arguments, have been widely
misunderstood. In this book James Doyle shows that once various errors of interpretation
have been cleared away, the claims can be seen to be far more plausible, and the arguments
far more compelling, than even her defenders have realized. Philosophers often seek
attention by making startling claims which are subsequently revealed as little more
than commonplaces wrapped in hyperbole. Doyle's book makes it clear that here, in
her greatest papers, Anscombe achieves something vanishingly rare in philosophy: a
persuasive case for genuinely unsettling and profound conclusions. The two lines of
argument, seemingly so disparate, are also shown to be connected by Anscombe's deep
opposition to the Cartesian picture of the mind.
Sujet(s) : Anscombe, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret (1919-2001) -- Critique et interprétation
Morale
Moi (philosophie)
Scepticisme
Identifiants, prix et caractéristiques : ISBN 9780674976504. - ISBN 0674976509
Identifiant de la notice : ark:/12148/cb45291964b
Notice n° :
FRBNF45291964
(notice reprise d'un réservoir extérieur)
Table des matières : Part One. No morality: "Modern moral philosophy" (1958): Virtue ethics, eudaimonism,
and the Greeks ; The invention of 'morality' and the possibility of consequentialism
; The misguided project of vindicating morality ; The futility of seeking the extension
of a word with no intension ; What's really wrong with the vocabulary of morality?
; Assessing "Modern moral philosophy" ; Part Two: No self: "the first person" (1975):
The circularity problem for accounts of 'I' as a device of self-reference ; Is the
fundamental reference rule for 'I' the key to explaining first person self-reference?
; Rumfitt's solution to the circularity problem ; Can we make sense of a nonreferential
account of 'I'? ; Strategies for saving 'I' as a singular term: domesticating FP
and deflating reference ; Epilogue: The anti-cartesian basis of Anscombe's scepticism.
