Notice bibliographique
- Notice
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010 .. $a 9780674976504
010 .. $a 0674976509
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101 0. $a eng
102 .. $a US
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181 .0 $6 01 $a i $b xxxe
181 .. $6 02 $c txt $2 rdacontent
182 .0 $6 01 $a n
182 .. $6 02 $c n $2 rdamedia
200 1. $a No morality, no self $b Texte imprimé $e Anscombe's radical skepticism $f James Doyle
214 .0 $a Cambridge (Mass.) $c Harvard university press $d 2018
215 .. $a 1 vol. (xi-238 p.) $d 25 cm
300 .. $a Bibliogr. p. [223]-230. Notes bibliogr. Index
330 .. $a It is becoming increasingly apparent that Elizabeth Anscombe (1919-2001), long known
as a student, friend and translator of Wittgenstein, was herself one of the most important
philosophers of the twentieth century. No Morality, No Self examines her two best-known
papers, in which she advanced her most amazing theses. In 'Modern Moral Philosophy'
(1958), she claimed that the term moral, understood as picking out a special, sui
generis category, is literally senseless and should therefore be abandoned. In 'The
First Person' (1975), she maintained that the word 'I' is not a referring expression:
in other words, its function in the language is not to pick out the speaker, or 'the
self' - or any entity whatsoever. Both papers are considered influential, and are
frequently cited; but their main claims, and many of their arguments, have been widely
misunderstood. In this book James Doyle shows that once various errors of interpretation
have been cleared away, the claims can be seen to be far more plausible, and the arguments
far more compelling, than even her defenders have realized. Philosophers often seek
attention by making startling claims which are subsequently revealed as little more
than commonplaces wrapped in hyperbole. Doyle's book makes it clear that here, in
her greatest papers, Anscombe achieves something vanishingly rare in philosophy: a
persuasive case for genuinely unsettling and profound conclusions. The two lines of
argument, seemingly so disparate, are also shown to be connected by Anscombe's deep
opposition to the Cartesian picture of the mind.
600 .| $3 11888910 $a Anscombe $b Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret $f 1919-2001 $3 12042895 $x Critique et interprétation $2 rameau
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801 .0 $b MH/DLC $g rda
930 .. $5 FR-751131007:45291964001001 $a 2018-104259 $b 759999999 $c Tolbiac - Rez de Jardin - Philosophie, histoire, sciences de l'homme - Magasin $d O
