Notice bibliographique
- Notice
000 cam 22 450
001 FRBNF435820950000005
010 .. $a 978-0-19-992290-1 $b rel.
035 .. $a OCoLC780288789
100 .. $a 20130822d2012 m y0engy50 ba
101 0. $a eng
102 .. $a US
105 .. $a ||||z 00|y|
106 .. $a r
181 .0 $6 01 $a i $b xxxe
181 .. $6 02 $c txt $2 rdacontent
182 .0 $6 01 $a n
182 .. $6 02 $c n $2 rdamedia
200 1. $a Misunderstanding financial crises $b Texte imprimé $e why we don't see them coming $f Gary B. Gorton
210 .. $a New York $c Oxford university press $d cop. 2012
215 .. $a 1 vol. (xiv-278 p.) $d 25 cm
300 .. $a Bibliogr. p 247-271
327 1. $a Introduction ; Creating the quiet period ; Financial crises ; Liquidity and secrets
; Credit booms and manias ; The timing of crises ; Economic theory without history
; Debt during crises ; The quiet period and its end ; Moral hazard and too-big-to-fail
; Bank capital ; Fat cats, crisis costs, and the paradox of financial crises ;
The panic of 2007-2008 ; The theory and practice of seeing.
330 .. $a Before 2007, economists thought that financial crises would never happen again in
the United States, that such upheavals were a thing of the past. In this book the
author argues that economists fundamentally misunderstand what they are, why they
occur, and why there were none in the U.S. from 1934 to 2007. The book offers a
back-to-basics overview of financial crises, and shows that they are not rare, idiosyncratic
events caused by a perfect storm of unconnected factors. Instead, he shows how financial
crises are, indeed, inherent to our financial system. Economists, he writes, looked
from a certain point of view and missed everything that was important: the evolution
of capital markets and the banking system, the existence of new financial instruments,
and the size of certain money markets like the sale and repurchase market. Comparing
the so-called "Quiet Period" of 1934 to 2007, when there were no systemic crises,
to the "Panic of 2007-2008," he ties together key issues like bank debt and liquidity,
credit booms and manias, moral hazard, and too-big-to-fail, all to illustrate the
true causes of financial collapse. He argues that the successful regulation that prevented
crises since 1934 did not adequately keep pace with innovation in the financial sector,
due in part to the misunderstandings of economists, who assured regulators that all
was well. He also looks forward to offer both a better way for economists to think
about markets and a description of the regulation necessary to address the future
threat of financial disaster
676 .. $a 338.542 $v 23
801 .3 $a US $b OCoLC $c 20130822 $h 780288789 $2 marc21
801 .0 $b DLC
930 .. $5 FR-751131008:43582095001001 $a 339.6 GORT m $b 759999999 $c Tolbiac - Rez de Jardin - Droit, économie, politique - Salle N - Libre accès $d N
