Notice bibliographique
- Notice
Type(s) de contenu et mode(s) de consultation : Texte noté : sans médiation
Auteur(s) : Sechser, Todd S.
Fuhrmann, Matthew (1980-....)
Titre(s) : Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy [Texte imprimé] / Todd S. Sechser, Matthew Fuhrmann
Publication : 2017
Description matérielle : 1 vol (XIII- 333 p.) : ill. ; 23 cm
Note(s) : Includes bibliographical references (pages 290-317) and index
"Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Since 1945, most strategic thinking
about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence--using nuclear threats to prevent
attacks against the nation's territory and interests. But an often overlooked question
is whether nuclear threats can also coerce adversaries to relinquish possessions or
change their behavior. Can nuclear weapons be used to blackmail other countries? The
prevailing wisdom is that nuclear weapons are useful for coercion, but this book shows
that this view is badly misguided. Nuclear weapons are useful mainly for deterrence
and self-defense, not for coercion. The authors evaluate the role of nuclear weapons
in several foreign policy contexts and present a trove of new quantitative and historical
evidence that nuclear weapons do not help countries achieve better results in coercive
diplomacy. The evidence is clear: the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons are almost
exclusively defensive, not offensive."--Page i
Sujet(s) : Politique militaire -- Études de cas -- Diplomatie
Guerre nucléaire
Relations extérieures -- États-Unis
Indice(s) Dewey :
355.021 7 (23e éd.) = Guerre nucléaire
Identifiants, prix et caractéristiques : ISBN 9781107106949. - ISBN 110710694X. - ISBN 9781107514515. - ISBN 1107514517
Identifiant de la notice : ark:/12148/cb45387197h
Notice n° :
FRBNF45387197
(notice reprise d'un réservoir extérieur)
Table des matières : Part I. The logic of nuclear skepticism. Nuclear blackmail in international politics
; Nuclear coercion and nuclear skepticism ; Part II. Trends. Standoffs : nuclear
weapons in crisis bargaining ; Stalemates : territorial disputes and nuclear politics
; Part III. Cases. Brinkmanship busts : when nuclear coercion fails ; Think again
: reassessing nuclear victories ; Part IV. Conclusions. Nuclear coercion in myth
and reality ; Appendix : methods and data.