Notice bibliographique
- Notice
Type(s) de contenu et mode(s) de consultation : Texte noté : électronique
Auteur(s) : Brânzei, Rodica (1949-....)
Titre(s) : Models in cooperative game theory [Texte électronique] : crisp, fuzzy, and multi-choice games / Rodica Brânzei, Dinko Dimitrov, Stef Tijs
Titre d'ensemble : Springer e-books
Publication : Berlin ; New York : Springer, cop. 2005
Description matérielle : 1 online resource (viii, 135 pages)
Collection : Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems ; 556
Note(s) : Includes bibliographical references (pages 129-132)-and indexes. - Print version record.
This book investigates models in cooperative game theory in which the players have
the possibility to cooperate partially. In a crisp game the agents are either fully
involved or not involved at all in coperation with some other agents, while in a fuzzy
game players are allowed to cooperate with infinite many different participation levels,
varying from non-cooperation to full cooperation. A multi-choice game describes the
intermediate case in which each player may have a fixed number of activity levels.
Different set and one-point solution concepts for these games are presented. The propertie
Autre(s) auteur(s) : Dimitrov, Dinko. Fonction indéterminée
Tijs, Stef. Fonction indéterminée
Sujet(s) : Théorie des jeux
Indice(s) Dewey :
519.3 (23e éd.) = Théorie des jeux
Identifiants, prix et caractéristiques : ISBN 9783540285090
Identifiant de la notice : ark:/12148/cb44684911t
Notice n° :
FRBNF44684911
(notice reprise d'un réservoir extérieur)
Table des matières : Cover ; Preface ; Table of Contents ; Part I Cooperative Games with Crisp Coalitions
; 1 Preliminaries ; 2 Cores and Related Solution Concepts ; 2.1 Imputations, Cores
and Stable Sets ; 2.2 The Core Cover, the Reasonable Set and the Weber Set ; 3 The
Shapley Value and the r-Value ; 3.1 The Shapley Value ; 3.2 The r-Value ; 4 Classes
of Cooperative Crisp Games ; 4.1 Totally Balanced Games ; 4.2 Convex Games ; 4.3
Clan Games ; Part II Cooperative Games with Fuzzy Coalitions ; 5 Preliminaries ;
6 Solution Concepts for Fuzzy Games ; 6.1 Imputations and the Aubin Core ; 6.2 Other
Cores and Stable Sets ; 6.3 The Shapley Value and the Weber Set ; 6.4 Path Solutions
and the Path Solution Cover ; 6.5 Compromise Values ; 7 Convex Fuzzy Games ; 7.1
Basic Characterizations ; 7.2 Properties of Solution Concepts ; 7.3 Participation
Monotonic Allocation Schemes ; 7.4 Egalitarianism in Convex Fuzzy Games ; 8 Fuzzy
Clan Games ; 8.1 The Cone of Fuzzy Clan Games ; 8.2 Cor
