Notice bibliographique
- Notice
Type(s) de contenu et mode(s) de consultation : Texte noté : sans médiation
Auteur(s) : Calomiris, Charles W.
Haber, Stephen H. (1957-....)
Titre(s) : Fragile by design [Texte imprimé] : the political origins of banking crises and scarce credit / Charles W. Calomiris and Stephen H. Haber
Publication : Princeton (N.J.) : Princeton university press, cop. 2014
Description matérielle : 1 vol. (xi-570 p.) : illustrations ; 24 cm
Collection : The Princeton economic history of the Western world
Lien à la collection : The Princeton economic history of the Western world
Note(s) : Bibliogr. p. 507-548. Index
"Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries, but not in others? The United
States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none.
The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have
provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households. Analyzing
the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada,
Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that
chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents due to unforeseen circumstances.
Rather, these fluctuations result from the complex bargains made between politicians,
bankers, bank shareholders, depositors, debtors, and taxpayers. The well-being of
banking systems depends on the abilities of political institutions to balance and
limit how coalitions of these various groups influence government regulations. Fragile
by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes
into bank regulation. Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber combine political history
and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest
groups form, why some endure while others are undermined, and how they generate policies
that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for
bank bailouts and rescues." Publisher's description
Sujet(s) : Banques -- Histoire
Banques -- Faillites
Crédit -- Histoire
Identifiants, prix et caractéristiques : ISBN 978-0-691-15524-1 (rel.)
Identifiant de la notice : ark:/12148/cb438877476
Notice n° :
FRBNF43887747
(notice reprise d'un réservoir extérieur)
